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"DOES A PATIENT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICAL TREATMENT?"
Nishant Kumar Singh*
"If I had my way, I could say good-bye, could choose my time
and be calm and collected about it. I had a good life and I would
dearly like a good death my last wish to die with dignity."'
"Entry and exit are gate of human existence, just as a man need
a midwife to aid him being born, he also needs similar means to
be unborn-to die peacefully...."2
Introduction
In the annals of medical jurisprudence, the right to informed consent has
occupied the central space. One of the most controversial issues in contemporary
health care is whether and when a patient may refuse medical treatment, the likely
consequence of which is death. The notion of patient's absolute autonomy has
been the subject of much debate in Indian legal circles.
This paper deals with the right to refuse medical treatment of the patient at
a three-fold level. Firstly, it seeks to test the premise of the right to refuse medical
treatment on the touchstone of various provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, it
examines the right to refuse medical treatment against the parameters of criminal
law. Thirdly, it inspects various defences available to the doctor in the law of torts.
Alongside, it also deliberates on the jurisprudential basis of informed consent. At
the outset it important to state that this article argues on the right to refuse medical
treatment for a terminally ill patient' only.
(A)

Formulating the Postulate of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

L

Does a Patient have Right to Privacy under the Article 21 of the
Constitution?

An individual has an innate right to privacy. To put it more plainly, the right
to privacy is a domain into which nobody can intercede. The right to refuse medical
* III Year B.A., L.L.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
1 See, Wolhander, Voluntary Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 363 (1984) at p. 374.
2 See, Deema Khatkate, Whose Life is it any Way?, EPW August 1990 at 872.
3 A terminally ill patient for the purpose of this paper is one whose process of natural death has
commenced on account of dreadful disease.
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treatment stems from the patient's right to privacy.4 The right to privacy has been
widely acclaimed and recognised in nearly all jurisdictions.' In a catena of cases,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to privacy to be an essential component
of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution.6 The right to privacy lies under the penumbra of other enumerated
rights, especially the right to liberty enshrined under Article 217. The enjoyment
of other rights is not possible without inherent right to privacy. It is submitted that
the right to privacy encompasses patient's right to refuse medical treatment.!
Competent patients have a right to make their own medical decision and treatment
if they wish, even if it means the prospect of natural death.9 In medical care cases,
the presumption is that a competent individual has the freedom to make his own
4 See, Richard, Liberalism, Public Morality and ConstitutionalLaw: prolegomenon to the
ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 50(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 123 (1988) at p. 148;
Jed Rubienfield, The Right to Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1997) at p. 789; Prof. William L.,
Privacy,48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960) at p. 421; Thomas, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55
Wash.L.Rev. 777 (1980) at p. 794; Bishnu Prasad, The Right to Privacy, A.I.R.(J) 1991 at pp. 113121; Steven J. Wolhander, Voluntary Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy,69(2) Cornell L. Rev. 363 (1984) at p. 396, presents this argument:
"it is legally inconsistent to honour a terminal patient's request that life support equipment be
removed, but to deny a similar situated patient's request for an immediate and painless end
merely because a second party's active assistance is needed to implement the latter request.
Prohibiting a second party from helping a patient commit self-euthanasia by imposing legal
sanctions on the party is effectively equivalent to denying the patient the right to make that
decision in the first place."
5 Article 17 of the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, 1948.
6 Krak Singh v. State of U.P.,(1964) 1 S.C.R.332; Govind v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378;
State ofMaharashtrav.Madhukar AIR 1991 SC 207; State of UP v. Shah Medicine, AIR 1969
SC 1234; State of Maharashtrav. Basanti Bai, AIR 1986 SC 1466; P.U.CL. v. Union of India,
(1997) 1 SCC 301; Mr 'X' v. Hospital 'Y', (1998) 8 SCC 296.
7 See, Govind v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378.
8 In the following cases it was held by the court that right to privacy encompasses the right to
refuse medical treatment: Saltz v.Perlmutter(1978,Fla App D4) ; SuperintendentofBelchertown
State school v. Saikewicz (1977, Mass); Lane v. Candura,376 NE2d 1232; Surenam v. Society of
Valley Hospital, 383 A2d 785, referred in Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics,
(1991). (In this case the court indicated that an individual's right to privacy encompasses the
right to choose or reject a cancer treatment on the advice of a licenced doctor); Re Quinlan 50 L
Ed 2d 289 (it was the first U.S. case in which the court decided that the right to privacy
encompasses the right to refuse treatment notwithstanding the fact that it will ultimately lead the
person to the death. Court categorically said that State interest theory in the individual life doesn't
apply when a person refuses the medical treatment. In effect in the democracy the individual is
the sovereign so autonomous. No one can claim monopoly over the life of the individual.)
9 See generally, Mathew, Dayna Rowen, The terminally Ill Condition in Virginia's NaturalDeath
Act, 67 Va.L. Rev. 749 (1987) at p.781.

38

The Student Advocate

[2000

choice 0 notwithstanding the fact that it may be detrimental to his life." It is further
submitted that when an individual chooses not to be treated and thereby shortens
his life, he can't be prevented from doing so by applying the state monopoly theory
(state interest theory) because in a democracy the individual is sovereign. Individual
is an autonomous body over whom nobody can assert his right.12 This right,
however, is not absolute. The right of the patient to abstain from medical treatment
must be balanced against the interests of the State. The four State interests most
commonly recognised by the courts in this regard are":
1)

the protection of third parties;

2)

the prevention of suicide;

3)

the protection of the ethical integrity of the medical community; and

4)

the preservation of life.

Therefore, a patient has the right to privacy, which encompasses the right to
refuse the medical treatment.
I.

Common Law Right to Self-determinationl 4 and the Due Process Clause
under Article 21

A person has a right to self-determination under common law.'5 The right
to self-determination provides for individual autonomy, human dignity, self-

10 In Superintendentof Belchertown v. Saikewicz and Satz v. Perlmutter: it was the opinion of the
court that Mr.McLellan has legal and moral right to make this decesion. He has the uncontrolled
right to control his own destiny under the right to privacy.
11 See, Rhoden, Nancy, K., Litigating ife and Death, 102, Harv. L. Rev., 418 (1988), at p. 420.
12 See, P.Rathnamv. Union Oflndia,(1994)3 SCC 413: the Supreme Court categorically pronounced
that individual is sovereign in the democracy.)
13 Superintendentof Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-741, 370
N.E.2d
417, 425 (1977) ; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223
(1985),
citedfrom, Note, DoctorPatientDialogue:A second Opinion On talk Therapy Through
Law, 30
Yale L.J., 458 (1981).
14 First comprehensive self determination test was laid down in Cantebury v. Spence,
409 US 1064
(1972).
15 Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 65 (199 1).
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consciousness' 6 and the right to choose. 7 The right to self-determination speaks
about bodily integrity of an individual, encroachment upon which constitutes battery
in the medical profession.
The fundamental ethical principle of the right to self determination was
stated by Justice Cardozo in the case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital" when he said:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault
for which he is liable in damages."
This principle underpins the common law concerning consent to treatment
in the UK. In Re T' 9 , Lord Donaldson set out the position as follows:
"An adult patient who suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it, or
to choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered.. .This
right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as
sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent."
More recently, this right of self-determination was reaffirmed in St. George's
HealthCare NHS Trust v. S20. In this case, having regard to the right of an individual
to personal autonomy, a pregnant woman's choice to refuse medical treatment at
the risk of death was upheld as valid under common law.
It is further submitted that all the rights of an individual rest upon the
individual's right to self determination and for that purpose Article 21 of the
Constitution is broad enough to include it.2' According to the self-determination
theory, a competent patient has the right to define his best for medical treatment,
hence a patient should be able to withdraw his consent at any time and stop
16 See, supra, n. 7; Note, Doctor Patient Dialogue:A second Opinion on Talk Therapy Through
Law, 30 Yale L.J., 458 (1981), at pp.471-472.
17 Sidway v. Boardof Governorsof the Bethlem Royal Hospitaland Maudsely Hospital, [1985] AC
817 :the Court held that a patient has the absolute right to choose medical treatment. This right
of choice is not limited to decisions, which other might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding
that the reasons for making choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.
18 (1914) 211NY 125, cited from Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 67 (1991).
19 (1992) 9 BMLR 46, cited from Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 35 (1991).
20 [19981 All ER 673, cited from Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 106 (1991).
21 See, Seervai, H.M., ConstitutionalLaw of India, (1993).
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treatment. 22 Therefore, a patient has the right to self-determination under Article
21 of the Constitution and this right includes right to forego medical treatment.23
III.

Does a Patient Have the Freedom of Conscience under Article 25 of the
Constitution?

Under Article 25 of the Constitution, a person has been invested with freedom
of conscience and religion.24 In Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospita', the Court upheld
the right to refuse treatment because of religious beliefs. In a catena of cases, the
Court held that a person has the right to refuse treatment on the ground of religious
beliefs, even if the practice of religious beliefs lead the person to the inevitable
death. 6 These American precedents have bearing in the Indian Context as the first
Amendment to the American Constitution also guarantees the freedom of conscience
and religion to their citizens. In Narayan Nambudripad v. Madras' the Court
relied upon the American precedents establishing freedom of conscience and
religion. The Freedom of conscience is also a corollary to the right to selfdetermination under the common law. Therefore, the denial of the right to refuse
medical treatment would be a violation of his right to free exercise of conscience,
and religion under the article 25 of the Constitution. 29

22 See, Note, Informed Consent and Dying Patient,83Yale L. J.(1974) at pp.1632-1664.
23 In re colyer; 660 P.2d 728(1983) ; In re Hamlin,689 P.2d 1372(1984): In these two cases court
viewed that common law right to self determination includes right to forego a medical treatment.
See, e.g., In re LH.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (basing right to self- determination
on the federal right to privacy); Corbett v.D'Allessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla.App. 1986) (basing
right to self- determination on state Constitutional guarantees of privacy), citedfrom, Mason &
Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 38 (1991): basing right to self-determination on state
Constitutional guarantees of privacy.
24 See generally, Gravey, Freedom of Choice in ConstituionalLaw, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1756 (1981);
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience; Applying Standards in Free Exercise, 80 Duke L.J. 1217
(1973); See also, Kamisar, Some Non-religious view Against proposed Mercy Killing Bill, 42
Minn. L. Rev., (1958) at pp.182-198; Note, Burden on thefree Exercise of religion:A subjective
Alternative,102 Harv. L. Rev. (1989) at pp.1258-1270.
25 340 F. Supp. 125
26 (I) Montgomery v. B.R.KC.E.R.AssociationCal App. 3d 447.
(1l) Re Osborne, 294 A2d 372.
(III) Re Estate of Brooks, 205 NE2d 435.
(IV) RE Melideo, 390 NYS2d 523.
27 AIR 1954 Mad. 385.
28 Marcus, The Forum of the Conscience: Applying standardunderfree Exercise Clause, 80 Duke
L. J.,(1973) at pp.1217-1254.
29 Devlin, Mill Liberty on Morals, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. (1965) at pp. 215-280.
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Does a Patient have the Freedom to Die with Dignityso under
Article 21 of the Constitution?

A person has the freedom to die" with dignity under the Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Article 21 provides for the protection of life and personal
liberty. The freedom to die comes under personal liberty, hence the freedom to die
is not in contravention with right to life. This right is clearly brought out in
Smt. Gian Kaur v. State of Putjab32 , where a Constitutional Bench observed:
"A question may arise in the case of a dying man, who is terminally ill
or in a persistent vegetative state... this ambit of cases may fall within
the ambit of the right to die with dignity aspartof the right to live with
dignity."33
Human dignity is a descriptive and value-laden quality, encompassing selfdetermination and the ability to make choices. To retain a similar level of control
over dying as one has exercised during one's life is seen by many as achieving
death with dignity.3 4 Therefore, it is submitted that a person has a right to refuse
medical treatment, which is supported by one's right to privacy, religion, selfdetermination and the freedom to die with dignity.
(B)

The Premise of Criminal Law": Does the Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment imply Abetment of Suicide?

Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code3 6 is not applicable to cases involving
the right torefuse medical treatment. There is no act on the part of the Doctor,
which leads to the patient committing suicide. Voluntary passive euthanasia doesn't
involve physician assistance. In voluntary passive euthanasia death results from
selective non-treatment because consent to treatment is withheld, It is therefore
legally permissible while active euthanasia is prohibited. Voluntary passive
euthanasia (the right to refuse medical treatment) and active euthanasia are
separable. The essence of the distinction lies in the means to obtain the same end,
30 Sustein, R.Class, The Right to Die, 108, Yale L. J. (1997) at pp. 1123-1163; Biggs Hazel,
Euthanasiaand Death With Dignity: Still Poised on the Fulcrum of Homicide, Crim. L. Rev.
(1996) at pp.878-888.
31 See, Bhattacharjee, A.M., Equality,Liberty and propertyunder the Constitution of India, (1997)
at p.94: Author has argued thatfreedom to die as one of the liberties that a person may rightfully
acclaim under the Article 21 of the Constitution.
32 1996(2) SCALE 881 at 888.
33 Emphasis supplied.
34 See, Biggs, Hazel, Euthanasiaand death with Dignity, Crim. L. Rev. 877 (1996) at pp.878-888.
35 Note, Criminal Liability in Assisting Suicide, 86 Col. L. Rev. 348 (1986) at p. 398.
36 Hereinafter referred as 'IPC'
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that the taking of active steps implies a control over the way in which an event
occurs. The doctor who administers the drug intended to end the life of a suffering
patient determines the moment and manner of the patient's death. The action of
the drug changes the physical cause of death and this is a matter of importance.
This process is quite different from allowing another agency -illness to cause
death. If section 306 prohibits voluntary passive euthanasia (the right to refuse
medical treatment), it would violate Articles 21 & 25 of the Constitution. Hence, it
would render sec. 306 as unconstitutional.
Therefore, it is submitted that there is no abetment of suicide in honouring
the patient's right to refuse medical treatment and voluntary passive euthanasia is
permissible, otherwise Sec.306 of the I.P.C. would violate Article 21 of the
Constitution.
(C)

Tortious Liability of a Doctor: Various Issues and Defences Examined

Does the doctor have a duty to intervene, if a terminally ill patient wishes to
refuse medical treatment even at the cost of death? Or is it the duty of the doctor to
respect the patient's autonomy and allow him to die?
Honouring the patient's autonomy and the right to refuse medical treatment
cannot be construed as negligence on the part of the doctor in performing his
professional duties. The burden of proof lies on the respondent who claims
compensation asserting that there has been negligence on the part of doctor, which
resulted in the wrongful death of the patient.
L

Does a doctor have a duty to treata Patientwhen he denies consent to it

Common law recognises the right to be free from bodily invasion.38 From
this right to be free from bodily invasion developed the doctrine of informed
consent.39 The doctrine of informed consent declares that in the absence of any
emergency situation, medical treatment may not be imposed without the patient's
informed consent. 40 A logical corollary to this doctrine is the patient's right, in
general, "to refuse treatment and to withdraw consent to treatment once begun. 4 1
37 See, Jean Davies, Rapingand Making Love are Different Concepts; so are Killing and Euthanasia,
14 J. Med. Ethics 148 (1988) at p. 149.
38 Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 77 (1991).
39 See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (Cardozo, J.)
40 Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 404, 604 A.2d 1003, 1008 (1992).
41 See, Titez, Gerald F., Informed Consent In the PrescriptionDrug Context; The Special case, 61
Wash. L. Rev. 367 (1986) at p. 417.
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Courts have unanimously concluded that4 2 this right to self-determination does
not cease upon the incapacitation of the individual. It is submitted that doctor does
not have any duty to treat the patient when he denies so.
In the leading case on consent to medical treatment, Sidaway v. Governors
of Bethlem Royal Hospital43 , the House of Lords, confirming that the Bolam test
applied, ruled that how much and what kinds of information a doctor should disclose
in order to inform a patient before obtaining consent, is a matter of clinical judgment.
The Bolam test broadly lays down that the standard of the ordinary skilled man
exercising and professing to have that special skill, it is sufficient if he exercises
the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular act."
Thus the information to be given to the patient before surgery is not a matter of
meeting criteria which have been objectively determined, but a matter for the doctor
to decide. Moreover, it is irrelevant that there is an alternative body of medical
opinion that would have provided the patient with more information, as long as a
body of opinion exists which supports what the defendant did. Ultimately this is a
matter for expert evidence, but if a doctor can demonstrate that a reasonably
competent practitioner in a similar situation would not have mentioned a certain
risk, he or she can escape liability.45
The House of Lords has recently modified the Bolam test in the case of
Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority, in which it was decided that a
judge may on certain rare occasions choose between two bodies of medical opinion,
if one is to be regarded as "logically indefensible". However, for the time being
this new approach does not extend to cases involving consent to treatment. Lord
Browne Wilkinson specifically excluded consent cases when he said:
"In cases of treatment and diagnosis there are cases where, despite a
body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the
defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here
considering questions of disclosure of risk)."
42 See, e.g., In re Colyer 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Mack, supra; In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), citedfrom Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law andMedical Ethics, 41
(1991).
43 [1985] 1 All 643.
44 Bolam v. FriernHospital Management Limited, [1957] 2 All ER 118 at p. 121.
45 There have been one or two cases in the UK (e.g. Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority
[1994] 5 Med LR) in which the Courts have taken a more pro-patient approach to the issue of
information provision, but these have been decided only at High Court level and the Sidaway
principle remains firmly entrenched in UK law.
46 (1997) 39 BMLR 1, citedfrom Mason & Mc Call Smith,Law andMedical Ethics, 25 (1991).
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Today a relationship between a patient and a doctor is marked by a fiduciary
character. In the modem medical practice a patient has the right to informed consent
and this right to informed consent presupposes the right to refuse medical
treatment. 47 Informed consent involves two vital elements: the patient must be given
information on the risks involved in the treatment, and he must assent to the
treatment.4 8 Without proper consent, administration of a treatment would amount
to battery49 under the common law.s0 Therefore, a doctor would be right in refusing
to administer treatment to a patient who has withheld consent for such treatment."
II.

Defence of Contributory Negligence

If negligence is pleaded on the part of doctor, he can take the defence of
contributory negligence on the part of patient in the case of tortious liability.s2 The
doctrine of contributory negligence seems to be founded upon the maxims volenti
nonfit injuria and injure non remota causasedproxima spectatur.The burden of
proof in such cases is on the defendant. Where it cannot be established as to what
extent the negligence of the plaintiff or that of the defendant has contributed to
47 See generally, Sheltz, From Informed Consent to PatientChoice: A New ProtectedInterest,.95
Yale L. J. 219 (1985) at p. 277.
48 See generally, Titez, Gerald F., Informed consent in the prescriptiondrug context: The Special
Case 61 Wash. L. Rev. (1986) at pp. 252-270; Note, Informed consent and The Dying Patient,
83 Yale L. J.(1981) at pp. 1632-1664; Sustein, R. Cass, Incomplete TheorisedAgreement, 108
Harv. L. Rev. (1905) at pp. 1733-179.
49 Battery involves intentionally bringing about a harmful or offensive contact with the person of
another without consent. The civil action has a dual purpose of providing protection to the
individual against bodily harm and also against any interference with his or her person, which is
offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity. For this tort to be committed it does not matter that
the interference was only trivial and did not involve pain. There need be no intention to hurt the
plaintiff, but only an intention to apply physical force of some kind. In medical cases, examples
of when battery may be committed include circumstances when the patient:
* Is treated against his or her will?
* Consents to one treatment but receives another or an additional
treatment.
* Is given treatment without being told that this will happen?
* Is treated under duress?
* Agrees to treatment after being provided deliberately with
information which is wrong.
50 See, Mohr v. William 104N.Y.12(1905) ; Pratt v. Davis 79 N.E. ; see also,
Hunter v. United
States, 236 F.Supp.4119(In this case court held that patient party won't be entitle
for the
compensation as the patient himself by refusing to medical treatment contributed
to negligence,
hence the claim must fail)
51 See, Mc Coid, Re Apprasailfor the liabilityfor unauthorisedtreatment,
41 Minn.L.Rev. (1965)
at pp.969-1042.
52 See, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Torts, (1997) at pp.5
02-5 10.
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bring about the injury, the suit will fail." Where the negligence of the both the
parties has caused death or injury, the common law rule is that the party who
alleges negligence is to fail.54 However, this rule is subject to the last opportunity
rule 5 In the last opportunity rule the single question involved is whose negligence
was it that substantially caused the damages.5 6 In the case, where a patient refuses
medical treatment the last opportunity is not with the doctor but it is largely
dependent upon the consent of the patient. Had the patient agreed to the treatment,
he would not have faced the drastic consequence of his death. A patient could
have easily avoided the prospect of death by undergoing the prescribed medical
treatment. Therefore, a patient voluntarily exposing himself to death by foregoing
medical treatment cannot seek tortious remedy, as he is the sole contributor to his
own death. Hence, a suit claiming damages for the wrongful death will fail.
Therefore, there is contributory negligence on the part of the patient and a
claim for compensation against the doctor would fail.
IIL

Surrogate Consent" and Protection of the Best Interest of the Patient

There are various legal theories on which authorisation to terminate life
support may be predicated. The approach taken is to allow a close family member
to exercise "substituted judgement" on behalf of the patient. In exercising
"substituted judgement," the surrogate considers the patient's personal value system
for guidance. The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about and
reactions to medical issues, all the facets of the patient's personality that the
surrogate is familiar with, his or her relevant philosophical, theological and ethical
values in order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient would
choose.
The substituted judgement approach "is intended to ensure that the surrogate's
decision as much as possible should be the decision that the incompetent patient
would make if he or she were competent. Even where the individual has not
expressed thoughts concerning life-sustaining treatment, the patient's preferences
can still be ascertained by referring to all aspects of his or her personality."
53 See, Vidya Devi v. Madhya Pradesh State Transport Corporation,AIR 1975 MP 89. For the
latest development in the law of contributory negligence, see, Nishant Kumar Singh & Nisha K.
Uberoi, The law of Torts,(1999) IX MOL at pp.199, 201.
54 Butterfield v. Forrestor,(1809) 11 East 60
55 Davies v. Mann, (1842) 10 M&W 546.
56 Supra, n.24.
57 Supra, n.7
58 See Estate of Longeway, 133 ll1.2d at 49-50, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300.
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There should be "clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent to
withdraw life support". 59 This is the most stringent approach. This standard requires
"[niothing less than unequivocal proof' of the patient's express wishes as to the
decision to terminate life support is at issue."
If this test is to be applied to all patients who did not have the prescience or
the sophistication to express clearly and unmistakeably their wishes on this precise
matter they would not be able to have life support removed. For those individuals,
the choice concerning medical treatment would not be an extrapolation based upon
their individual beliefs. Rather, the "choice" would be dependent simply upon
how far the frontiers of medical science have advanced: if the life sustaining
procedures were available, they would be automatically administered. Thus, it is
submitted that the substituted judgement standard is the proper approach.
It is suggested that a close family member is well suited to the role of
substitute decision-maker in such circumstances. Close family members are
usually the most knowledgeable about the patient's preferences, goals, and values;
they have an understanding of the nuances of his personality that sets him apart as
an individual. 62 In addition to the greater knowledge of the patient's personal views,
close family members have a special bond with the patient. "Our experience informs
us that family members are generally most concerned with the welfare of a

patient." 63

59 It is notable here that the term "clear and convincing evidence" in this context refers to the
requirement that the individual in question must have stated in an explicit fashion the exact
treatment desired were the patient to lapse into various medical conditions. The term "clear and
convincing evidence" is used more commonly, however, as a burden of proof. In that context,
the standard refers to that quantum of evidence necessary for a party to establish a point. For
further illumination on the distinction see generallyComment, The Right to Die, 96 Dick.L.Rev.
649, 651 and 665-669.
60 In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 (N.Y. 1988). See
also Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd., Cruzan v. Director, MO. Health
Dept., 497 (11) U.S. 261 (1990) (court found that PVS patient's expressions to a roommate that
she would not want to be maintained on life support if she were ever to become a "vegetable,"
and other similar observations, did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard because
the statements did not deal specifically with the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition.
insufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard; the PVS patient was thus
maintained on life-support.)
61 Accord see, e.g., Colye 94 Wash.2d at 127, 660 P.2d at 745-746; Foody v. ManchesterMemorial
Hospital, 482 A. 2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) ; Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415-417, 529 A.2d at 445,
referred in Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 132 (1991).
62 See also Jobes, 108 N.J. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445.
63 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445.
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Furthermore, concomitant to the surrogate's exercise of the patient's right
to refuse treatment, the surrogate must also obtain written statements of two doctors
qualified to evaluate the patient's condition. These statements must certify that the
patient has been diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state. If the patient
has an attending physician, that physician shall also prepare a statement." It is
submitted that surrogate consent can't be taken when the patient himself has
expressed his wish and protest against treatment. Surrogate consent 65 should be
permissible, only when, the patient does not express his own view about the
proposed medical treatment and not competent enough to express his will.
Furthermore, surrogate consent is deniable, especially when it runs in counter to
the patient expressed view on that point. In several cases courts have decided that
even in the incompetent state surrogate consent can't be taken. 66
Therefore, it is submitted that surrogate consent should not be taken when it
runs counter to the previous directive given by a patient.
Conclusion
"The conceptual confines of death are forever in flux. In what is a
crisisofmodern technology,there is a highpossibility of an individual
being compelled to exist, by artificialprolongationof his life, against
his will."67
In the light of the above-mentioned authorities and arguments, the attempt
has been to establish that the right to refuse medical treatment has sound theoretical
footing. In essence, the entire understanding of the right to refuse medical treatment
is based upon the sound tenet of informed consent and notion of patient's autonomy.
Considered judicial opinions on the subject unequivocally establish the patient's
right to refuse medical treatment. However, there is controversy about its absolute
character. Limitation of State-interest theory circumvents its broad scope only to

64 See also, Jobes, ibid.
65 See, W.J.S.O., Proxy Decision-Makingfor the Terminally ill: the Virginia Approach, 70 Va.L.
Rev.(1987) at pp.749-81.
66 Mason & Mc Call Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 107 (1991).
67 Nishant Kumar Singh & Srishti Jha, Euthanasiais Illegal in India: Exploding the Myth, 5 Law
& Medicine 297 (1999) at p. 300.
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terminally ill patients or patients who are in persistent vegetative state.68 According
to one commentrator, "A competent patient, even one who is not terminally ill, has
69
a right to refuse medical treatment is virtually absolute one" Further, the right to
refuse medical treatment has posed complex questions and serious difficulties in
the case of surrogate consent or proxy consent. There are contradictory opinions
on its legal admissibility.
There is a crying need for legislative intervention so as to formulate certain
guidelines for surrogate consent. This legislative measure, because of the extensive
range of possibilities for abuse and misuse by the relatives in collusion with some
unscrupulous medical professionals should be drafted after thorough empirical
studies of samples drawn from the medical profession normally dealing with such
terminally ill. The purpose is to identify the parties who stand for and against the
measure and locate determinate variables and situations for people's apathy or
sympathy. Predictive studies are useful in gauging the possibilities of misuse of
proposed'measure. Organised predictive research outside the legislature is a
condition precedent for meaningful lawmaking today.70
In preparation of this apparent inevitability, it is suggested here that the
surrogate consent must have both convincing evidence of patient's desire not to
have life sustaining intervention and medical information equivalent to that which
a competent patient would have had before consenting to or rejecting the
treatment.1 This approach promotes a patient's common law and the Constitutional
right of personal choice. It also appropriately incorporates the traditional reliance
of health care decision making on the doctrine of informed consent.

68 A recent article published in The New England Journal of Medicine introduced a distinction
between persistent and permanent vegetative states. The article stated that "[a] wakeful
unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks is referred to as a persistent vegetative state
.... A permanent vegetative state, on the other hand, means an irreversible state ..... MultiSociety Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Pts. 1 & 2), 330
New Eng. J. Med 1499, 1501 (1994) (emphasis supplied). Based on review of prior PVS cases,
the article concluded that where a persistent vegetative state was brought on by traumatic injury,
the state can be judged permanent twelve months after the occurrence of the injury; the article
noted that recovery after twelve months is exceedingly rare. Id. at 1575. For a discussion of one
such emergence from a permanent vegetative state, see Nancy L. Childs, M.D. & Walt N. Mercer,
Brief Report: Late Improvement in Consciousness After Post-Traumatic Vegetative State, 334
New. Eng. J. Med. 24 (1996)
69 See, Jack Schwartz, Writing the Rules ofDeath: State Regulation of PhysicianAssisted Suicide,
Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics, 24 (1996) at pp. 207-16.
70 See, Rajkumari Agrawala, Indian legal Research, 24 JILI 470 (1982) at 472.
71 See, Nancy Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 402 (1988) at p. 421.

